Tag: Politics

  • 2024 Indonesian Elections: The Role of Technology, Administration and Fair Play

    2024 Indonesian Elections: The Role of Technology, Administration and Fair Play

    The General Elections Commission (KPU) of Indonesia, in preparing for the 2024 elections, faces an enormous task. They face the challenge of organizing a fair and efficient election, especially in a vast and diverse country like Indonesia. The General Elections Commission (KPU) will have the task of managing the logistics, ensuring voter accessibility, and maintaining the integrity of the electoral process.

    Transparency in vote counting and result declaration will be crucial to maintain public trust in the electoral process. Voter education and ensuring access to remote or underserved regions also are significant tasks.

    The complexity of this challenge is amplified by the country’s vast geographical spread and cultural diversity. The KPU’s role extends beyond the basic logistics of organizing polling stations and distributing ballot materials. It also involves ensuring that every eligible voter, from the bustling streets of Jakarta to the most remote villages in Papua, has equal access to the voting process. This means addressing language barriers, and physical accessibility issues, and ensuring that the diverse needs and circumstances of Indonesia’s multifaceted population are catered to.

    A key component of the KPU’s mandate is to uphold the integrity and transparency of the election. This encompasses not only the actual casting and counting of votes but also the pre-election period, which must be free from unfair practices and undue influence. The commission is tasked with rigorously monitoring campaign activities, managing political party registrations, and overseeing the fair allocation of campaign resources.

    Technology and social media are set to play a huge role in this election. With a large and increasingly tech-savvy population, the campaigns will leverage these platforms for outreach, engagement, and countering misinformation. The integrity of the elections relies on the literation of people with technology as a safety net. Citizens need to utilize online platforms as key spaces for digging for information and observing public debates and policy discussions. This momentum needs to be used to build a better process of democracy.

    In an era where misinformation can spread rapidly, the role of technology and social media in the election process becomes a double-edged sword. While these platforms offer unprecedented opportunities for voter engagement and education, they also pose risks of misinformation and electoral manipulation. The KPU must work in tandem with tech companies and civil society to monitor these spaces and ensure that the information disseminated is accurate and impartial.

    Moreover, there’s an increasing need for digital literacy among voters. In an age where fake news and biased information are rampant, the ability of the electorate to critically evaluate the information they receive online is crucial. Educational campaigns about discerning reliable news sources and recognizing misinformation are as important as traditional voter education programs.

    As the election approaches, the dynamics of these aspects will evolve, reflecting the aspirations and challenges of a nation on the move. The 2024 Indonesian elections will not just be a political contest. These elections are a barometer of Indonesia’s evolving democracy, its economic aspirations, and its role on the global stage. These will be a reflection of the country’s journey towards progress and its vision for the future. The outcomes will shape the nation’s trajectory in the years to come.

    The 2024 elections are not just a test of Indonesia’s administrative capabilities but also a reflection of its democratic maturity. The way these elections are conducted will speak volumes about the nation’s commitment to democratic principles such as fairness, transparency, and inclusivity. The elections will also be a litmus test for Indonesia’s position on the global stage, influencing foreign investment, international partnerships, and its role in ASEAN.

    As Indonesia continues to evolve economically and politically, these elections will be a significant milestone in its journey. The success of the elections in reflecting the will of the people and in being a fair representation of Indonesia’s diverse voices will be pivotal in shaping the country’s future trajectory. The outcomes of the 2024 elections will indeed set the course for Indonesia’s progress and its vision for the coming years, making it a crucial event not only for Indonesians but for the broader region and the world.

  • The New Politics of Accountability

    The New Politics of Accountability

    Accountability is associated with fulfilling the obligation of the rulers to provide reasons for responsibilities and authority granted. In other words, the principals who have transferred and delegated power have certain rights to demand answers for conduct and policies made by the agents.

    This makes clear that a robust mechanism of accountability has a positive impact on enhancing social welfare and achieving social justice.

    Protection of human rights, alleviation of poverty, freedom of speech, equalization of educational opportunities and health care access, promotion of political equality, police reform, and infrastructure provision could be achieved only by having a reliable system of accountability.

    It is generally accepted that the most powerful mechanism of accountability is free and fair elections, in which electorates could cast their votes to support or protest the rulers for the actions that they took when they were in power.

    This vertical form of accountability has apparently been celebrated in Indonesia. It is the fact that the last four governments have been produced by democratic elections. Indeed, reasonably free and fair elections have been experienced in the election of national and local governments.

    Therefore, the nation has been considered as one of the biggest democratic country in the world and a leading model of democracy for the Islamic world.

    To harness the major democratic achievement and in order for the democracy to work well in advancing the social progress of electorates, there must thus exist the separation of independent state institutions that permit them to authorize, control and sanction the power-holders.

    As a democratic nation, Indonesia has obviously exercised the actual practice of checks and balances. There has existed a clear role and duty of political mechanism (executive and legislature), fiscal mechanism (official system of audit and financial accounting), administrative mechanisms (hierarchical reporting, public service codes of conduct), and legal mechanisms (corruption control agencies, ombudsmen and the judiciary).

    As can be seen, at certain times the state bodies do work professionally in providing and criticizing the curtailment of the original action of public agencies and the branches of governments. However, at other times rather than providing an independent voice and critical evaluation, they just provide legitimacy for the abuses made by the power-holders.

    Most crucially, this horizontal form of accountability has traditionally fixated on managerial and functional accountability. It is only concerned on measurable and quantifiable aspects rather than less tangible changes in social and political processes. In fact, a strong mechanism of accountability should be a key guarantor of equalizing human, economic, social and political rights, which are not always measurable.

    Furthermore, it is important to highlight that satisfying perceived managerial accountability requirements of prominent independent state institutions and systems may not necessarily yield improved mission achievement of the top power holders. It could actually lead to mission drift as has experienced by many previous governments in Indonesia or other countries.

    It seems clear that managerial accountability has simplified and coalesced complex social and political realities into only discrete components. It also could somehow distract the mission achievement of top power holders. Thus, this form of accountability is contended to be not maximal to increase and accelerate the reliability of policy making and to leverage the advancement of social welfare.

    Given this realities, there is an emergence need to shift from narrow managerial accountability focus and to establish means of allowing the scope to embrace social accountability practices. It emphasises the use of a holistic and downward form of accountability, which recognizes the basic right of every member of society to involve in the decision making that matter upon them.

    In other word, civil society’s engagement in policy decision making and budget formulation at national and local government is argued to be the way forward. Through this process, ordinary citizens, communities, independent media, and civil society organizations are centrally involved in determining social and political development priorities and assessing the outcomes of government activities.

    This means, through this process, all members of society are encouraged and provided platform to enforce standards of good practices on public officials and service providers.

    This type of accountability approach may well also be relevant as a way to increase pressure on government detailed information provision, which has been implemented in developed countries such as the United Kingdom. Hence, the details of government thinking and activities would not be concealed and obscured from public scrutiny. This is of course also a form and process of accountability.

    It is argued that social accountability should be embraced in practice, otherwise the voices of the poor would be left speaking into a void. Poor society always experience major barriers in accessing justice, and are particularly susceptible to being excluded from policy making. Poor people are also all vulnerable if they cannot reliably hold their government accountable for the policy that they take in the public realm.

    The role of the family is also crucial to ensure the application of social accountability through family and school education. As the label goes, social accountability relies on civic engagement including active role of the people in the periphery and the smallest unit called family to participate in exacting the accountability.

    It is important to note that although top government level has strong sense of good visions and action plans to accelerate the development of the nation, it is impossible to accomplish them without real control, support, helps and contributions from wider society.

    However, strategies should be developed in the process to manage the potential tension between the mandated and formal form of managerial and functional accountability and less formal and genuine civil society involvement of social accountability.

    Finally, it is believed that the promotion of a greater use of social accountability imbued with strong ethical values would certainly make it as an effective catalyst for revolutionary social change and robust development of Indonesia.

  • The Politics of Sharia Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia

    The Politics of Sharia Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia

    The period of study was 1945-1998. ‘Jakarta Charter’ was not included in the constitution, and a secular constitution for Indonesia was adopted. A ‘new order’ military dictatorship in 1965 saw the perpetuation of the secular-nationalist elites’s domination of the bureaucracy and military. Although movements based on ‘political Islam’ or Islamist movements were convenient allies of the rulers up to 1965, largely to keep a check on leftist movements (socialist and communist forces), the rulers soon oppress and suppress ‘political Islam’ for the most 1965-1998.

    Following Suharto’s fall from power in 1998, the was a wave of ‘Islamisation’ or ‘creeping Shariasation’ in the political and social spheres, driven by Islamist parties and movements. Naturally the secular state opposes. Furthermore, following Aceh’s peace agreement in August 2005, Islamist movements continued to rise which resulted in increasingly stricter public observance of a certain (hardline) version of Islam. Today there are virginity test for girls, anti-LGBT rules and rhetoric, no dating after dark, tightening of alcohol consumption, stronger Ahmadi and minority sects persecution, and stricter observance of Aceh’s hudud code and other Shariah-inspired regulations.

    However since 1999, Islamist parties failed to gain power, or in fact on the decline. The adoption of shariah law is ‘clustered’ by region or district instead of following a national trend. Although Orthodox Islam is popular among non-aristocratic elites, they are more attracted to meritocracy instead of automatic affiliation with Islamist movements.

    On the other hand, many (but not all) of the more hardline Islamist movements post-1998 have direct links – which are often familial – to Darul Islam Rebellion 1948-1962. In fact it was suggested that the military revived Darul Islam in many forms, including Jemaah Islamiah, for various reasons.

    In the post-1998 democratisation, Islamist movements have been influential, but not Islamist parties. Even so, Islamist movements failed to penetrate the formal political system although they have a strong following at grassroot level.

    The secular-nationalist elites maintained monopoly on power especially at national level, especially so when Bush administration in the US designated Indonesia and SEA as the second front in the ‘war on terror’. Yet they still need local allies whose ideology and orientation are not often aligned to theirs. By allying themselves with Islamist movements, the elites moderate and control sphere of influence of the latter and benefit from their grassroot reach. In return Islamist movements benefit from political representation at national level.

    By contrast, Islamist (political) parties do not have the social capital, economic capital and cultural capital compared to Islamist movements. The latter also are more comfortable with alliances with secular-nationalist elites instead of being with Islamist parties.

    CONCLUSION: Changing power relations among elites dominating the state have forced them to ‘reach out’ and ‘reach down’ in the political arena. They have also become more receptive to demands of societal groups (for Shari’ah to play a greater role) but only if such groups provide information and resources that state elites can use to gain and maintain power. Not all Islamist actors that mobilise (Islamist movements) also influence politics (or take part in it). Islamist parties are not the transformation belt of Islamist agenda. State elites mediate the influence of groups in the society.

    Q&A INCLUDING WITH DR JONES and DR CHAPLIN

    Indonesia can be divided into 6 clusters in terms of ‘Shari’ah implementation’. In some clusters, the local Islamist movements and political mobilisation have direct link to Darul Islam eg: in South Sulawesi. In other areas eg: West Java there is no direct link. Acheh is different because the ‘Shariasation’ happened after (former president) Gus Dur gave autonomy as an incentive to achieve peace.

    Is there a link between moderate Islamist movements and violent groups in the street demonstrations against Ahok Nov 2016 – Jan 2017? No link (as far as research goes). The massive demonstration is just a direct effect of mass transformation of the political landscape. The above-ground pro-Shariah movements often have no link to Salafist, jihadidist movements. Despite their preference for God-given laws, they are practical about the practical reality of a democracy (which Indonesia is).

    Is there a link between Islamist groups and the underworld? Often the more underground Islamist groups are involved in the black economy, some run un-Islamic rackets of smallcrime, some are thugs. Eg: JAT has both clandestine wing and above-ground wing.

    Arab Spring spillover effect? Some violence-prone ISIS sympathisers do join some of the more hardline movements. HT and FPI, among many, have become more sympathetic to ISIS policies. However this is a small trend which is unlikely to see mass transformation from Islamism to extremism.

    Islamisation in Indonesia is not part of an internatinal movement or trend, but rather part of the local democratic process. Rise of the middle class and their preference of ‘civil Islam’ is quite independent (chapter 5 of book) from the development of of local Shari’ah impementation (at cluster level or otherwise). West Java vs Sulawesi. Mehdi Hasan argued that Islamist movements have forced democratisation on themselves. Also the secular-nationalist elites often use religion as (political) capital instead of committing to being real Islamist.

    What are costs of ignoring these groups? Islamist movements tend not to back the right politician, thus explaining their failure to gain power despite their popularity (eg: Yasin Limpo).

    Is it safe hedge in terms of political policy? Islamist movements in South Sulawesi demanded for Shari’ah law but shifted towards a broader partnerhsip with the government. In return it received government funding for social programmes in the region. Since 1998, the rise of Islamist movements have been met with equally pragmatic evolution of the state to fit into the new landscape. Today, politicians find better ways to organise themselves through alliances but at the same time sideline or marginalise Islamist movements in the power equation.

    (Continued) At the same time they cannot ignore the Islamist movements (particularly their demand for greater Shari’ah implementation) because it would give rise to local vigilantism. For example, FPI received money from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    Is the general trend worrisome, especially in anti-Ahok demonstration? Probably not. Indonesian police generals pushed back protesters in gubernatorial election (that Ahok contested). It is nothing as worrisome as it is in the US.

    What are the economic underlying these Islamist movements? There are usually very provincial, local entreprises supporting these movements. By all accounts they are nothing too impressive. FPI (a few more) solicit donations from local business people. There are also partnerships with police at both national and local levels. Business are diverse, ranging from local restaurants, used car, recycling businesses, etc. There also also project-orientated funding by the likes of Qatar Foundation, Kuwait Foundation and other Middle Eastern sources. One positive outcome from this is these local movements are quite successful at pulling people out of terrorism into local vice police (or preventing them from getting involved to begin with). This is a strong pull factor for big actors to continue supporting them.

    On more clandestine groups? Some run protection racket that also protects minorities like Ahmadi/Qadiyani or Shiah (among other unintended outcomes). It is also important to note that there are 2 groups of Ahmadi, one views founder was a prophet after Muhammad, another only as a scholar. Modest vivendi to maintain the balance. However, this did not prevent certain groups, believed to be running on Saudi money, to campaign against ‘deviants’ in local elections which resulted in violence against minorities.

    Not these groups all are vigilante thugs extorting money from minorities in return for protection. Some very sincerely Islam-based. Many thrive on young intellectuals but Salafist. Despite everything, Hizbut-Tahrir find support among urban middle class. Things are more complex than it seems.

    Why did we arrive at this point? This is mostly an effect of the 1965 settlement, where the Islamist groups then were used to help the army massacre against leftist, communist, socialist groups; only for the army to turn on them later. Today it is not clear what actually motivates them. What is clear is that the elites continued to ‘moderate’ the local Islamist movements, mostly motivated by achieving election victories. However, this has proven fragile (by evidently fluidly changing allegiences) and may be abandoned for more convenient partners.

    Any lesson? First and foremost, social movements in under-democratised country are not conducive. For them to have impacts, all organs of state and the necessary democratic machineries must be functional and mature.

    Another challenge is it is difficult to get straight answers if foreign researchers are doing groundworks. Local respondents answer questions in very peculiar way eg: hijab is good for women to save cost on hairfressing, modest dress is aimed at reducing skin cancer risk, with almost no reference to Islamic law (whereas we know their real motivation is to implement Shari’ah according to their interpretation). Bias towards foreigners make research very difficult.

    The army seemed to have revived Darul Islam out of desperation. Anti-Ahok movements potrayed the military as friends, and the police as the enemy. One reason for convergence in Ahok’s case is both racial and religious (him being a Christian Chinese). Some went as far as fanning the under wrong sentiment that Chinese capital being used to revive communist proliferation. There as also been a ‘proxy war’ which spreads an impression that the West is trying to weaken young Indonesians through ‘Western’ agenda eg: LGBT, liberalism, etc.

    Which version of Islam is dominant in Indonesia? Initially Yemeni, Gujarati scholars brought Islam with strong Sufi and Shiah elements. On the Sunni side, the Shafi’i school dominates, but tariqat elements have strong hold. Shiah community is very small, maximum of 2.4m-4.0 million people. Even Bali bombing was as such (a Hindu area was chosen) because it was supposedly in relatiation to Hindus killing Muslims in Gujarat riot. There is a nebulous interaction and inter-relatedness between one and another between all the religious and political groups which cannot be easily explained.

    NEWS: http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39033231 (Indonesian)

    NOTE: A large section of this report is prepared under the Chatham House rule. Unless otherwise stated, the identity of each participant is not disclosed and any point in this report cannot be attributed to any specific individual.

    DISCLAIMER: The above note is a rough summary of the discussion, and is not an authoritative account nor it is an accurate representation of what the speakers actually said or stood for.

    THE POLITICS OF SHARI’A LAW at School of Oriental and African Studies
    Monday 20 February 2017 at 19:00
    https://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/20feb2017-the-politics-of-sharia-law.html

    Speakers:
    – Dr Michael Buehler, writer if the book, Department of Politics and International Studies
    – Dr Sidney Jones, Director, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta, Indonesia
    – Dr Chris Chaplin, Cambridge graduate, PhD on Wahabi movement in Jogjakarta. Research Fellow, Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, The Netherlands.