Category: Civil Society

Politics, Regional Issue, Indigenous Peoples, Local Wisdom, Social Culture

  • Sumud Flotilla and the Diplomacy of the Society

    Sumud Flotilla and the Diplomacy of the Society

    The Global Sumud Flotilla has emerged as one of the strongest symbols of the new wave of “society diplomacy” in today’s deadlocked world of global deadlock on Palestinian genocide. When global governments remain trapped in rigid power plays, civil societies across continents have chosen to act directly. Activists, humanitarians, and ordinary people sailed towards Gaza, not only to deliver aid but to demonstrate that conscience must not remain silent. This journey is not just about supplies; it is a peace voyage meant to awaken the world to the urgency of the humanitarian crisis.

    At the heart of this initiative lies the world’s diplomatic paralysis, which is somehow complicated to see as a humanitarian crisis. On one side, Arab and Muslim countries continue to call for a ceasefire and the end of occupation, yet their voices are often fragmented by regional and national agendas, focusing more on security calculations. On the other side, Israel and the United States persist in negotiations shaped by their strategic self-interest, control, and domination alliances rather than on genuine humanitarian concerns. This imbalance has turned international diplomacy into a theatre of power, where human suffering is sidelined once more by the same ethical crisis among leaders and superpowers.

    In such a setting, humanity is the greatest casualty. For the people of Gaza, daily life under blockade and bombardment represents the harshest form of collective punishment. Israel’s narrative of defense cannot justify the deprivation of food, medicine, water, and electricity to millions of civilians. International law is clear: collective punishment is prohibited. What is taking place is not defense but the systematic erosion of human dignity, carried out in full view of a hesitant global community, something that a long time ago vanished and is rising once more today in high-tech civilization.

    This is why societal diplomacy becomes so crucial. The flotilla was not organized by governments or states, but by networks of NGOs, humanitarian coalitions, social actors, and committed volunteers. It is society, not the state, that has raised its hand to say “enough.” Through this initiative, ordinary people are proving that the moral responsibility for peace does not rest solely with political elites. It also belongs to communities of conscience who cannot watch injustice unfold without action.

    Yet, instead of welcoming this effort, Israel intercepted the ships, arrested the activists, and criminalized their mission. Participants were branded as security threats or even linked to terrorism. Such a reaction exposes the deep insecurity of an occupying power that fears solidarity as much as resistance. If bringing food, medicine, and compassion is called terrorism, then the moral compass of that civilization has truly lost its direction.

    The response of the United States also reveals the contradictions of modern diplomacy. While the US speaks of humanitarian corridors and peace negotiations, it simultaneously shields Israel from accountability. By framing the flotilla as a “provocation” rather than a humanitarian call, Israel once again objects to the universal principles of kindness and human rights. This selective diplomacy highlights the bankruptcy of a system that still operates through colonial logics of domination.

    Even if the humanitarian aid carried by the flotilla has not yet reached Gaza’s refugees, the moral intention behind it has already resonated across the world. The determination of hundreds of activists from dozens of countries has sparked global conversations, drawing attention to the blockade and occupation. Their voyage has turned into a story of courage, solidarity, and moral clarity. It shows that when governments remain silent and try to do kind diplomacy, civil society can become the loudest voice for justice.

    The Sumud Flotilla has already achieved its destination. It has awakened the conscience of millions, redefined what diplomacy can mean, and strengthened the global call for freedom and justice. It has been shown that diplomacy is not the monopoly of states; it is also the practice of people who act in solidarity with one another. This is the true power of society diplomacy, an act of conscience that refuses to be silenced.

    Society diplomacy, therefore, offers a new pathway when official diplomacy collapses. It demonstrates that in moments of political deadlock, ordinary people can step in to lead moral and humanitarian agendas. The Sumud Flotilla is not merely symbolic; it represents a living example of how global communities can organize transnational action to put pressure on power structures, to reshape public opinion, and to bring dignity back into the discourse of international relations.

    The broader lesson is that colonialism, in all its forms, must be erased from the modern world, as stated in many national declarations and statutes. The Palestinian struggle is not an isolated case; it is a mirror reflecting unfinished struggles of decolonization and human rights. As long as the occupation continues, the credibility of global governance remains in question. The flotilla reminds us that colonial structures are not relics of the past but present realities that demand collective resistance.

  • A Failed Political Escalation in Indonesia, When Elites Try to Take Advantage of Peaceful Demonstrations

    A Failed Political Escalation in Indonesia, When Elites Try to Take Advantage of Peaceful Demonstrations

    The wave of demonstrations that erupted in Indonesia in recent weeks reflects deep public frustration toward inequality, corruption, and the privileges enjoyed by political elites. What began as a peaceful movement demanding accountability, particularly regarding lawmakers’ allowances and the erosion of public trust, was meant to highlight systemic injustice. Yet, in the midst of this legitimate civic outcry, certain elites and local actors attempted to hijack the protests, turning them into political tools for their own advantage. This maneuver, however, backfired, creating what can be seen as a failed political escalation that ultimately weakened the credibility of those involved.

    At the core of this escalation lies the dangerous opportunism of local political brokers, who often see unrest as a chance to delegitimize opponents or strengthen bargaining positions within the state apparatus. Rather than channeling the protests into constructive reforms, they instead amplified tensions, hoping to gain visibility or extract concessions. Such actions reflect a common pattern in Indonesian politics, where mass mobilization is not only an expression of grievances but also a stage for elite competition and maneuvering. In this case, the attempt to politicize the movement undermined the authentic voices of students, workers, and civil society groups.

    The escalation also exposed how fragile the boundary is between legitimate dissent and manipulated chaos. Local actors, which some linked to rival factions within parliament or regional power structures, encouraged confrontational tactics and spread inflammatory narratives. Their aim was not justice or reform but to destabilize the government and open opportunities for negotiation or influence. By doing so, they placed the nation’s stability at risk, treating demonstrations not as a democratic right but as a bargaining chip in the game of power.

    However, the people on the ground proved more discerning than the elites anticipated. Student groups, delivery workers, and women’s alliances refused to let their agenda be diluted by hidden political motives. They continually emphasized that their demands were about structural reform—ending unjust privileges, curbing corruption, and improving welfare. By keeping their focus clear, these groups exposed the opportunism of the political elites, thereby preventing the escalation from spiraling into a national political crisis. This resilience demonstrates the maturity of Indonesian civil society in guarding its movement from being co-opted.

    The failed escalation also underscores a broader lesson about nationhood. Indonesia’s democracy is still fragile, with institutional weaknesses and ongoing elite capture of the state. Yet, when elites overstep, often using peaceful demonstrations as pawns in their political game, they reveal their detachment from the real aspirations of the people. Such miscalculations not only erode their legitimacy but also reinforce public cynicism toward political institutions. The danger lies in how repeated attempts of this nature can exhaust the energy of civic movements, leaving society vulnerable to authoritarian impulses.

    Nationhood, in its true essence, requires a shared responsibility to preserve peace and advance justice. When local actors play dangerous games, they endanger not only political stability but also the moral fabric of the republic. Exploiting demonstrations for short-term gains betrays the sacrifices of citizens who risk their safety to voice legitimate concerns. The misuse of people’s energy for elite battles deepens mistrust and fragments the collective sense of belonging that underpins Indonesian identity.

    The attempt to escalate peaceful demonstrations into political turmoil stands as a caution and moral lesson for all. It reveals both the predatory instincts of certain elites and the resilience of grassroots actors who refused to surrender their struggle to manipulation. For Indonesia to strengthen its democracy and nationhood, it must ensure that civic movements remain rooted in public interest, free from elite capture. Only then can demonstrations serve as instruments of reform rather than stages for political gamesmanship.

  • Politics at the Borders: Trump’s on the Mexico and Gaza Issues

    Politics at the Borders: Trump’s on the Mexico and Gaza Issues

    The role of a leader in managing border conflicts is crucial in ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in policy implementation. However, political leaders often manipulate these issues to serve their interests. Current U.S. President Donald Trump is a key example of how political figures leverage border crises to consolidate power and reshape administrative agencies. His handling of the U.S.-Mexico border and his stance on the Gaza conflict highlights how politicians use border security issues to stir public emotions, justify administrative changes, and benefit their political base. Instead of focusing on sustainable solutions, Trump prioritized rhetoric and political advantage over practical governance.

    At the U.S.-Mexico border, Trump’s policies were largely defined by his “America First” ideology, emphasizing strict immigration controls, border wall expansion, and the demonization of migrants. His administration implemented policies such as the “Remain in Mexico” program, which forced asylum seekers to stay in Mexico while their cases were processed. Additionally, Trump pushed for Title 42, a pandemic-era rule that allowed the rapid expulsion of migrants under the guise of public health concerns. While these measures were justified as necessary for border security, they were also tools for political mobilization, reinforcing his image as a nationalist leader who prioritized American security over humanitarian concerns.

    One of the significant ways Trump stirred the border situation was by reshuffling administrative agencies overseeing immigration policies. Rather than improving the efficiency of border security, his administration frequently replaced key officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with loyalists who aligned with his political ideology. This practice led to instability and inefficiency, as policy directions frequently shifted to match Trump’s political agenda rather than long-term border security goals. His approach exemplified how politicians manipulate administrative structures to serve personal and party interests instead of focusing on effective governance.

    Also, this goes on Gaza; Trump’s handling of the Gaza issue followed a political playbook aimed at solidifying his support among specific voter bases. His administration’s unwavering support for Israel, including the controversial move to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and cutting aid to Palestine, further intensified the conflict. While his administration claimed these moves were for peace and stability, they significantly altered the balance of power, worsening humanitarian conditions in Gaza. His rhetoric, particularly on social media and in speeches, exacerbated tensions rather than fostering diplomatic solutions, showcasing how border conflicts can be politicized to secure domestic political gains. Furthermore, Trump’s background was as a businessman, specifically in the hospitality and property industries.

    Another key aspect of Trump’s political manoeuvring was his ability to use border issues to attack political opponents and justify drastic policy changes. At the Mexico border, he repeatedly blamed Democrats for weak immigration laws, using the crisis as leverage to push for policy shifts that aligned with his political goals. Similarly, in the Gaza conflict, his administration’s actions undermined traditional diplomatic channels, sidelining established international agencies that previously mediated the conflict. His policies in both cases reflected a pattern where politicians create or amplify crises to justify changes that benefit their political standing rather than resolving the actual problem.

    The real concern in these situations is that administrative agencies responsible for border management should focus on efficiency and effectiveness rather than political agendas. Ideally, these agencies should implement data-driven policies that ensure national security while balancing humanitarian considerations. However, when politicians interfere by frequently changing leadership or implementing policies based on ideological rather than practical considerations, the result is a system plagued by inefficiency and instability. Trump’s tenure demonstrated how politicized border policies often lead to administrative chaos rather than effective governance.

    Amazingly, it succeeds; Trump’s approach underscores how politicians manipulate public perception by framing border issues as existential threats. By portraying immigrants at the Mexico border as criminals or terrorists, he heightened public fear, making extreme policies more acceptable. Similarly, his stance on Gaza, where he presented a one-sided narrative favouring Israel, deepened divisions and limited the potential for balanced diplomatic efforts. These tactics serve to rally political supporters but do little to resolve the underlying issues.

    In reality, true border management requires a stable and competent administration that prioritizes problem-solving over political gains. Repeated leadership changes and policy shifts driven by political motivations weaken institutional capacity. This is evident in the last of Trump’s presidency, where immigration policies remained in flux, and diplomatic relations in the Middle East continued to suffer from the repercussions of his tenure. Political interference in administrative agencies ultimately results in inefficiency, as seen in the handling of both the U.S.-Mexico border and the Gaza crisis.

    Future leaders must learn from these examples and ensure that border policies prioritize sustainability over short-term political advantages. We hate to admit it, but Trump’s approach to border issues—both in Mexico and Gaza—exemplifies how politicians stir up crises to push their own agenda rather than focusing on governance efficiency. The prospect of a reshuffling of administrative agencies, implementation of politically charged policies, and use of fear-mongering rhetoric highlight how border conflicts can be manipulated for electoral and ideological gains. It is supposed that effective border management should be about long-term stability and humanitarian balance, but when politicians prioritize political loyalty over institutional effectiveness, the result is a fragmented and inefficient system. Something that would disappoint many of us.

    References

    1. Reedy, J., O’Brien, B. G., & Hurst, E. H. (2023). Pandemic politics: Immigration, framing, and Covid-19. Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics, 8(2), 246-266.
    2. Montange, L. (2022). Political detentions, political deportations: Repressive immigration enforcement in times of trump. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 40(2), 332-350.
    3. Laurence Benenson and Nicci Mattey. Trump’s First 100 Days: Potential Immigration Actions. National Immigration Forum.
    4. Betsy Klein and Lex Harvey. Trump suggests his plan for Gaza Strip is to ‘clean out the whole thing’. CNN Politics.
    5. Sam Phelps. How Trump’s suggestion to ‘clean out’ Gaza sent shockwaves through the Middle East. The Conversation.
    6. Ibrahim Khazen and Betul Yilmaz. Thousands protest Trump’s ‘clean out’ Gaza proposal in Egypt’s Rafah border crossing. Anadolu Agency.
    7. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/title-8-and-title-42-statistics
    8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Title_42_expulsion
  • Revamping Education Infrastructure in Indonesia Post-2024 Elections

    Revamping Education Infrastructure in Indonesia Post-2024 Elections


    Revamping Indonesia’s education infrastructure is critical to boosting the nation’s development and enhancing literacy rates. The core of this revamping process involves substantial improvements in physical infrastructure, curriculum modernization, technology integration, and teacher training. Upgrading school facilities across Indonesia, especially in remote and rural areas, is pivotal. Many schools lack basic amenities such as proper classrooms, sanitation, and learning materials. By addressing these physical deficiencies, students can enjoy a more conducive learning environment, leading to improved attendance and engagement. Furthermore, integrating modern technology in classrooms, such as computers and internet access, is essential in bridging the digital divide. It enables students to access global knowledge resources, preparing them for the demands of a digitized world.

    The impact of these improvements on development and literacy is profound. A well-equipped and contemporary education system lays the foundation for a literate, skilled workforce, driving economic growth and innovation. Enhanced literacy rates and standard education access are directly correlated with improved employment prospects, higher incomes, and better health outcomes. As education levels rise, individuals gain the skills and knowledge necessary to participate effectively in the regional economy. This participation is not just in traditional sectors but also in emerging fields like technology and green energy, which are crucial for Indonesia’s future economic diversification and sustainability. Moreover, educated citizens are more likely to engage in democratic processes and contribute to the social and political discourse, fostering a more informed and active civil society.

    Integrating Curriculum and 6-year Middle Education Stage

    Integrating junior high school and senior high school into a single, continuous six-year middle education stage represents a significant shift in the educational paradigm. This approach aims to provide a seamless, comprehensive learning experience that bridges the gap often found between junior and senior levels. This integration also becomes an innovative solution to the lack of classrooms available in senior high schools, especially in rural and remote areas. This integration also cut the cost of national preparation and continuation from junior high school to senior high school.

    Updating and standardizing the curriculum to meet international standards is crucial. The focus should be on holistic education that includes critical thinking, problem-solving, and creativity, alongside traditional academic subjects. Special emphasis on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education can prepare students for the demands of the modern workforce. This curriculum also should be built as an achievable target for all students and teachers. Curriculum Merdeka is a promising approach for this, in the time as regulators, the government need to keep it simple and open for any variations in implementation in the different regional challenges.

    Investing in teacher training is paramount. Well-trained, motivated teachers are essential for delivering quality education. Continuous professional development, adequate remuneration, and incentives can help attract and retain talented educators. Many teachers have advanced expertise but lack systematic skills like organizing time schedules. management and digital literacy. Teachers need to keep the curriculum as simple as that. Ensuring that the education system is inclusive and accessible to all, including students with disabilities, those from minority groups, and girls, is critical for equitable development.

    Infrastructure Upgrade and Technology Integration

    Many schools in Indonesia, especially in rural areas, suffer from inadequate facilities. Improving physical infrastructure such as classrooms, libraries, and laboratories is essential. This includes ensuring access to basic utilities like electricity and internet, which are crucial for modern education. This situation is also burdened by less digital literacy and skills, in many support sectors and services.

    Incorporating technology into education is vital in the digital age. This involves providing computers and tablets, establishing reliable speedy internet connections, and developing digital literacy programs. Technology can enhance learning experiences and provide access to a wealth of educational resources, enabling students to compete in a globalized world. In a complex education ecosystem, technology can help a lot to accelerate national targets.

    Enhanced education infrastructure directly impacts literacy rates. With better access to quality education, more children can develop foundational reading and writing skills, which are crucial for further learning and personal development.

    Education Excess and Social Development

    An educated population is better equipped better to engage with and contribute to the global community. It enhances the country’s competitiveness in the regional and international arena, particularly in sectors reliant on skilled labour. A well-educated workforce is more productive and better equipped to contribute to the economy. Education is closely linked to innovations and improvements in productivity, which are key drivers of economic growth.

    Education plays a significant role in social development. It promotes values such as tolerance, civic responsibility, and environmental awareness. Educated individuals are more likely to participate in democratic processes and contribute positively to society. Indonesia can address social and economic inequalities by providing access to quality education. Education offers opportunities for individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds to improve their life circumstances.

    In a broader context, the revitalization of Indonesia’s education infrastructure is a strategic investment in the nation’s future. Improved education and literacy rates are key drivers of human development, contributing to a reduction in poverty and inequality. This holistic development approach promotes a more equitable society, where opportunities for advancement are accessible to all, regardless of background or location. Revamping the education infrastructure in Indonesia is a multifaceted approach that requires significant investment and policy reforms. However, the potential benefits are vast, extending beyond improved literacy rates to encompass broader economic and social development.

    In turn, this inclusivity enhances social cohesion, moderation and national unity, essential ingredients for a stable and prosperous Indonesia. A robust, inclusive, and modern education system is indispensable for Indonesia’s ambition to become a leading global player and to ensure equitable development for all its citizens. By prioritizing education infrastructure and literacy, Indonesia positions itself not only as a regional leader but also as a competitive player on the global stage, equipped with a workforce ready for the challenges of the 21st century.

  • 2024 Indonesian Elections: The Role of Technology, Administration and Fair Play

    2024 Indonesian Elections: The Role of Technology, Administration and Fair Play

    The General Elections Commission (KPU) of Indonesia, in preparing for the 2024 elections, faces an enormous task. They face the challenge of organizing a fair and efficient election, especially in a vast and diverse country like Indonesia. The General Elections Commission (KPU) will have the task of managing the logistics, ensuring voter accessibility, and maintaining the integrity of the electoral process.

    Transparency in vote counting and result declaration will be crucial to maintain public trust in the electoral process. Voter education and ensuring access to remote or underserved regions also are significant tasks.

    The complexity of this challenge is amplified by the country’s vast geographical spread and cultural diversity. The KPU’s role extends beyond the basic logistics of organizing polling stations and distributing ballot materials. It also involves ensuring that every eligible voter, from the bustling streets of Jakarta to the most remote villages in Papua, has equal access to the voting process. This means addressing language barriers, and physical accessibility issues, and ensuring that the diverse needs and circumstances of Indonesia’s multifaceted population are catered to.

    A key component of the KPU’s mandate is to uphold the integrity and transparency of the election. This encompasses not only the actual casting and counting of votes but also the pre-election period, which must be free from unfair practices and undue influence. The commission is tasked with rigorously monitoring campaign activities, managing political party registrations, and overseeing the fair allocation of campaign resources.

    Technology and social media are set to play a huge role in this election. With a large and increasingly tech-savvy population, the campaigns will leverage these platforms for outreach, engagement, and countering misinformation. The integrity of the elections relies on the literation of people with technology as a safety net. Citizens need to utilize online platforms as key spaces for digging for information and observing public debates and policy discussions. This momentum needs to be used to build a better process of democracy.

    In an era where misinformation can spread rapidly, the role of technology and social media in the election process becomes a double-edged sword. While these platforms offer unprecedented opportunities for voter engagement and education, they also pose risks of misinformation and electoral manipulation. The KPU must work in tandem with tech companies and civil society to monitor these spaces and ensure that the information disseminated is accurate and impartial.

    Moreover, there’s an increasing need for digital literacy among voters. In an age where fake news and biased information are rampant, the ability of the electorate to critically evaluate the information they receive online is crucial. Educational campaigns about discerning reliable news sources and recognizing misinformation are as important as traditional voter education programs.

    As the election approaches, the dynamics of these aspects will evolve, reflecting the aspirations and challenges of a nation on the move. The 2024 Indonesian elections will not just be a political contest. These elections are a barometer of Indonesia’s evolving democracy, its economic aspirations, and its role on the global stage. These will be a reflection of the country’s journey towards progress and its vision for the future. The outcomes will shape the nation’s trajectory in the years to come.

    The 2024 elections are not just a test of Indonesia’s administrative capabilities but also a reflection of its democratic maturity. The way these elections are conducted will speak volumes about the nation’s commitment to democratic principles such as fairness, transparency, and inclusivity. The elections will also be a litmus test for Indonesia’s position on the global stage, influencing foreign investment, international partnerships, and its role in ASEAN.

    As Indonesia continues to evolve economically and politically, these elections will be a significant milestone in its journey. The success of the elections in reflecting the will of the people and in being a fair representation of Indonesia’s diverse voices will be pivotal in shaping the country’s future trajectory. The outcomes of the 2024 elections will indeed set the course for Indonesia’s progress and its vision for the coming years, making it a crucial event not only for Indonesians but for the broader region and the world.

  • 2024 Indonesian Elections: Promising Future and Emergence of New Leaders

    2024 Indonesian Elections: Promising Future and Emergence of New Leaders

    The 2024 Indonesian elections promise to be a significant event, shaping the future of the nation in profound ways. As we approach this pivotal moment, let’s explore the various aspects that are likely to characterize this election.

    Political Landscape and Key Parties

    The presence of several influential parties marks Indonesia’s diverse political landscape. The PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and the Golkar Party have historically been prominent players. Their influence stems from established networks and historical significance in Indonesian political history. We can expect a vigorous campaign from these parties, along with significant efforts from Gerindra, the Democratic Party, and others. Each party will be looking to consolidate its base while reaching out to the undecided voters.

    The election will likely see coalitions forming, as parties seek to maximize their chances. The new promising coalition of Nasional Demorakrat (Nasdem), PKB and PKS also cannot be underestimated, as all parties seek to maximize their chances. These coalitions can be fluid and sometimes unpredictable, reflecting the dynamic nature of Indonesian politics.

    Emerging Leaders and Presidential Candidates

    With President Joko Widodo’s term ending, there’s a space for new leadership. Potential candidates might include prominent ministers, regional leaders, or figures outside traditional political circles. The focus will be on the emerging leaders who are poised to be presidential candidates, the race is open for new faces to make a mark.

    Figures like Prabowo Subianto, who has been a significant figure in past elections, and other rising stars (Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo) in Indonesian politics, will be closely watched for their policies and vision for Indonesia’s future.

    The choice of vice-presidential candidates, minister candidates and support teams will also be pivotal, as they can bring regional balance or specific expertise to a ticket. This momentum will promote many new potential leaders, in many levels of bureaucracy. The current change in leadership will be fuel for Indonesia’s progress in the next 10-20 years ahead.

    Key Issues and Voter Concerns

    The electorate will be influenced by several key issues, such as economic recovery post-COVID-19, tackling corruption, infrastructure development, and addressing environmental concerns. The candidates’ stances on these issues will be critical in swaying voter opinion. The important issue is to survive in the next potential economic crisis. How to bring Indonesia to face middle-income trap and Indonesia Emas 2045.

    The global community will be watching these elections closely. Indonesia, as a leading ASEAN country, plays a pivotal role in regional politics and economics. The election outcomes will be closely watched by international investors and governments. The outcomes will affect international relations, trade, and regional stability. Trade policies, foreign relations, and Indonesia’s stance on regional issues like the South China Sea will be influenced by the new leadership.

    The citizens will be looking for leaders who can deliver on promises, drive economic growth, improve living standards, and elevate Indonesia’s standing on the global stage. People demand more than just promises and formality. Today Indonesia is a bit different, with more literate generations and technology-savvy. Young voters, in particular, will be looking for leaders who address contemporary concerns like job creation, digital economy, and climate change.

  • The Sheikh Jarrah Incident: The Toothless Arab Countries vs Israel

    The Sheikh Jarrah Incident: The Toothless Arab Countries vs Israel

    The South China Morning Post, a respected daily from Hong Kong, on the 17 of May, has picked up the stance of Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia in rallying the Muslims against the latest Israel atrocities.

    In its comments, the Hong Kong SCMP said that the three countries have taken up the strong sentiments of its populace and the governments where the Arab countries have left.

    This is not the first time such an observation is being made by a foreign observer concerning the movement of the centre of gravity of the Muslim World to the Far East rather than the traditional Middle East.

    With the world’s largest Muslim population of 276 million in 2021, Indonesian coupled with Turkey, Malaysia and Brunei looks stronger and should be the de facto spokesman for the Muslim World.

    The Arab world, with 22 countries and having a humongous 422 million Arab Muslims looks toothless and spineless in dealing with its arch-enemy, Israel, alone country with only 8.77 million people.

    The Israel government, in response, on the 17 of Mei has warned Malaysia on its continuing support of Hamas deemed a terrorist organisation by the US and the western world.

    It should be reminded that a Palestinian lecturer cum engineer was gunned down, residing in Gombak in the suburban of East Kuala Lumpur in April 2018.

    He was alleged to have been killed after the dawn prayers by Mossad, the Israel intelligence.

    In response to the threat, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) of Malaysia said that security will be beefed up and is taking the threat seriously.

    I am sure such a comment about the role of the Arab countries in dealing with murderous Israel will not be the last frank observation in the international analysis of their fellow Arab brethren unto the Palestinians.

  • What’s next in Malaysia’s democracy sequence?

    What’s next in Malaysia’s democracy sequence?

    Malaysian democracy entered a new phase after the appointment of a new government promising the restoration of justice and rule of law in place of 61 years of Barisan Nasional rule. What model will shape our democracy now? Will it be a better democracy? The word democracy, from demos means “common people” and kratos means “strength”. It is no surprise then that “people’s power” or “from the people to the people” is one of democracy’s buzzwords. Despite the intriguing definitions, critics say democracy was built upon enslavement and discrimination when Athens’ aristocrats denied slaves, women and foreign residents from taking part. For approximately 1.3 million Indian soldiers who served the British Empire during the First World War to fight tyranny and depression against Germany occupation, it was paradoxical that India had been under colonial British rule for nearly 200 years!

    A possible pathway for an emerging democracy is democratic sequencing, an idea to increase the likelihood of democracy being a success, consists of 2 prerequisites: state-building and liberal constitutionalism; rule of law. This idea advocates that for democratisation to succeed initially the rule of law must be upheld and state institutions must be stable and neutral. In the past, political disagreements often provided ample opportunities for political extremist groups to emerge and take action against others with different political ideologies using violence, threats and physical abuse. The response from the authorities were often late and selective. Groups like the Red Shirt group and political stunt master Dato Jamal Yunos must no longer be allowed to take the law into their own hands. State institutions such as enforcement agencies must work within the boundary of the Constitution. Unlawful detention and hostile techniques that cost the lives of Teo Beng Hock and Ahmad Sarbani should never be part of interrogation tactics in the future . Intellectual discourses on various political and social issues must be allowed from the bottom to the highest level especially in academic environments such as universities.

    With these, together with mechanisms and features such as clean and fair elections, the segregation of powers, political plurality and diversity in civil society entities only then will it bring true democratic substance and results. The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government and the  opposition parties in Parliament, mainly UMNO have a huge tasks to make this a reality and it is hugely important that every leader is enlightened and committed to democracy and respect for the rule of law. On a final note however, we must also remind ourselves that there are many others posing as reformers and paying tribute under the name of democracy as a means to pursue personal gains.

  • The Politics of Sharia Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia

    The Politics of Sharia Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia

    The period of study was 1945-1998. ‘Jakarta Charter’ was not included in the constitution, and a secular constitution for Indonesia was adopted. A ‘new order’ military dictatorship in 1965 saw the perpetuation of the secular-nationalist elites’s domination of the bureaucracy and military. Although movements based on ‘political Islam’ or Islamist movements were convenient allies of the rulers up to 1965, largely to keep a check on leftist movements (socialist and communist forces), the rulers soon oppress and suppress ‘political Islam’ for the most 1965-1998.

    Following Suharto’s fall from power in 1998, the was a wave of ‘Islamisation’ or ‘creeping Shariasation’ in the political and social spheres, driven by Islamist parties and movements. Naturally the secular state opposes. Furthermore, following Aceh’s peace agreement in August 2005, Islamist movements continued to rise which resulted in increasingly stricter public observance of a certain (hardline) version of Islam. Today there are virginity test for girls, anti-LGBT rules and rhetoric, no dating after dark, tightening of alcohol consumption, stronger Ahmadi and minority sects persecution, and stricter observance of Aceh’s hudud code and other Shariah-inspired regulations.

    However since 1999, Islamist parties failed to gain power, or in fact on the decline. The adoption of shariah law is ‘clustered’ by region or district instead of following a national trend. Although Orthodox Islam is popular among non-aristocratic elites, they are more attracted to meritocracy instead of automatic affiliation with Islamist movements.

    On the other hand, many (but not all) of the more hardline Islamist movements post-1998 have direct links – which are often familial – to Darul Islam Rebellion 1948-1962. In fact it was suggested that the military revived Darul Islam in many forms, including Jemaah Islamiah, for various reasons.

    In the post-1998 democratisation, Islamist movements have been influential, but not Islamist parties. Even so, Islamist movements failed to penetrate the formal political system although they have a strong following at grassroot level.

    The secular-nationalist elites maintained monopoly on power especially at national level, especially so when Bush administration in the US designated Indonesia and SEA as the second front in the ‘war on terror’. Yet they still need local allies whose ideology and orientation are not often aligned to theirs. By allying themselves with Islamist movements, the elites moderate and control sphere of influence of the latter and benefit from their grassroot reach. In return Islamist movements benefit from political representation at national level.

    By contrast, Islamist (political) parties do not have the social capital, economic capital and cultural capital compared to Islamist movements. The latter also are more comfortable with alliances with secular-nationalist elites instead of being with Islamist parties.

    CONCLUSION: Changing power relations among elites dominating the state have forced them to ‘reach out’ and ‘reach down’ in the political arena. They have also become more receptive to demands of societal groups (for Shari’ah to play a greater role) but only if such groups provide information and resources that state elites can use to gain and maintain power. Not all Islamist actors that mobilise (Islamist movements) also influence politics (or take part in it). Islamist parties are not the transformation belt of Islamist agenda. State elites mediate the influence of groups in the society.

    Q&A INCLUDING WITH DR JONES and DR CHAPLIN

    Indonesia can be divided into 6 clusters in terms of ‘Shari’ah implementation’. In some clusters, the local Islamist movements and political mobilisation have direct link to Darul Islam eg: in South Sulawesi. In other areas eg: West Java there is no direct link. Acheh is different because the ‘Shariasation’ happened after (former president) Gus Dur gave autonomy as an incentive to achieve peace.

    Is there a link between moderate Islamist movements and violent groups in the street demonstrations against Ahok Nov 2016 – Jan 2017? No link (as far as research goes). The massive demonstration is just a direct effect of mass transformation of the political landscape. The above-ground pro-Shariah movements often have no link to Salafist, jihadidist movements. Despite their preference for God-given laws, they are practical about the practical reality of a democracy (which Indonesia is).

    Is there a link between Islamist groups and the underworld? Often the more underground Islamist groups are involved in the black economy, some run un-Islamic rackets of smallcrime, some are thugs. Eg: JAT has both clandestine wing and above-ground wing.

    Arab Spring spillover effect? Some violence-prone ISIS sympathisers do join some of the more hardline movements. HT and FPI, among many, have become more sympathetic to ISIS policies. However this is a small trend which is unlikely to see mass transformation from Islamism to extremism.

    Islamisation in Indonesia is not part of an internatinal movement or trend, but rather part of the local democratic process. Rise of the middle class and their preference of ‘civil Islam’ is quite independent (chapter 5 of book) from the development of of local Shari’ah impementation (at cluster level or otherwise). West Java vs Sulawesi. Mehdi Hasan argued that Islamist movements have forced democratisation on themselves. Also the secular-nationalist elites often use religion as (political) capital instead of committing to being real Islamist.

    What are costs of ignoring these groups? Islamist movements tend not to back the right politician, thus explaining their failure to gain power despite their popularity (eg: Yasin Limpo).

    Is it safe hedge in terms of political policy? Islamist movements in South Sulawesi demanded for Shari’ah law but shifted towards a broader partnerhsip with the government. In return it received government funding for social programmes in the region. Since 1998, the rise of Islamist movements have been met with equally pragmatic evolution of the state to fit into the new landscape. Today, politicians find better ways to organise themselves through alliances but at the same time sideline or marginalise Islamist movements in the power equation.

    (Continued) At the same time they cannot ignore the Islamist movements (particularly their demand for greater Shari’ah implementation) because it would give rise to local vigilantism. For example, FPI received money from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    Is the general trend worrisome, especially in anti-Ahok demonstration? Probably not. Indonesian police generals pushed back protesters in gubernatorial election (that Ahok contested). It is nothing as worrisome as it is in the US.

    What are the economic underlying these Islamist movements? There are usually very provincial, local entreprises supporting these movements. By all accounts they are nothing too impressive. FPI (a few more) solicit donations from local business people. There are also partnerships with police at both national and local levels. Business are diverse, ranging from local restaurants, used car, recycling businesses, etc. There also also project-orientated funding by the likes of Qatar Foundation, Kuwait Foundation and other Middle Eastern sources. One positive outcome from this is these local movements are quite successful at pulling people out of terrorism into local vice police (or preventing them from getting involved to begin with). This is a strong pull factor for big actors to continue supporting them.

    On more clandestine groups? Some run protection racket that also protects minorities like Ahmadi/Qadiyani or Shiah (among other unintended outcomes). It is also important to note that there are 2 groups of Ahmadi, one views founder was a prophet after Muhammad, another only as a scholar. Modest vivendi to maintain the balance. However, this did not prevent certain groups, believed to be running on Saudi money, to campaign against ‘deviants’ in local elections which resulted in violence against minorities.

    Not these groups all are vigilante thugs extorting money from minorities in return for protection. Some very sincerely Islam-based. Many thrive on young intellectuals but Salafist. Despite everything, Hizbut-Tahrir find support among urban middle class. Things are more complex than it seems.

    Why did we arrive at this point? This is mostly an effect of the 1965 settlement, where the Islamist groups then were used to help the army massacre against leftist, communist, socialist groups; only for the army to turn on them later. Today it is not clear what actually motivates them. What is clear is that the elites continued to ‘moderate’ the local Islamist movements, mostly motivated by achieving election victories. However, this has proven fragile (by evidently fluidly changing allegiences) and may be abandoned for more convenient partners.

    Any lesson? First and foremost, social movements in under-democratised country are not conducive. For them to have impacts, all organs of state and the necessary democratic machineries must be functional and mature.

    Another challenge is it is difficult to get straight answers if foreign researchers are doing groundworks. Local respondents answer questions in very peculiar way eg: hijab is good for women to save cost on hairfressing, modest dress is aimed at reducing skin cancer risk, with almost no reference to Islamic law (whereas we know their real motivation is to implement Shari’ah according to their interpretation). Bias towards foreigners make research very difficult.

    The army seemed to have revived Darul Islam out of desperation. Anti-Ahok movements potrayed the military as friends, and the police as the enemy. One reason for convergence in Ahok’s case is both racial and religious (him being a Christian Chinese). Some went as far as fanning the under wrong sentiment that Chinese capital being used to revive communist proliferation. There as also been a ‘proxy war’ which spreads an impression that the West is trying to weaken young Indonesians through ‘Western’ agenda eg: LGBT, liberalism, etc.

    Which version of Islam is dominant in Indonesia? Initially Yemeni, Gujarati scholars brought Islam with strong Sufi and Shiah elements. On the Sunni side, the Shafi’i school dominates, but tariqat elements have strong hold. Shiah community is very small, maximum of 2.4m-4.0 million people. Even Bali bombing was as such (a Hindu area was chosen) because it was supposedly in relatiation to Hindus killing Muslims in Gujarat riot. There is a nebulous interaction and inter-relatedness between one and another between all the religious and political groups which cannot be easily explained.

    NEWS: http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-39033231 (Indonesian)

    NOTE: A large section of this report is prepared under the Chatham House rule. Unless otherwise stated, the identity of each participant is not disclosed and any point in this report cannot be attributed to any specific individual.

    DISCLAIMER: The above note is a rough summary of the discussion, and is not an authoritative account nor it is an accurate representation of what the speakers actually said or stood for.

    THE POLITICS OF SHARI’A LAW at School of Oriental and African Studies
    Monday 20 February 2017 at 19:00
    https://www.soas.ac.uk/politics/events/20feb2017-the-politics-of-sharia-law.html

    Speakers:
    – Dr Michael Buehler, writer if the book, Department of Politics and International Studies
    – Dr Sidney Jones, Director, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta, Indonesia
    – Dr Chris Chaplin, Cambridge graduate, PhD on Wahabi movement in Jogjakarta. Research Fellow, Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, The Netherlands.